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Abstract: 
How do crying foul strategies, such as saying opponents are trying to "terrify" into a decision, pressure 
opponents to argue well?  I submit that crying foul strategies work by making a norm determinate, and 
by making manifest the badness of the tactic and that the speaker is exercising forbearance.  I explain 
why they generate pressure to repair or abandon questionable tactics, particularly when the norms they 
bring to bear in a situation converge with those of a broader political culture. 
 
Text of paper: 
How can arguers effectively counter questionable tactics?  Researchers have inventoried or 
recommended some moves arguers may make in response to such tactics, such as saying that "no 
reason has been given to suggest that those doubts are well-founded" (Jackson & Jacobs, 2006, p. 96); 
or ignoring the questionable tactic, using it reciprocally, or challenging the use of it (Vasilyeva, 2010).  
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have advised that arguers not “automatically” counter questionable 
tactics by invoking rules with a “goody two-shoes response” (p. 436).  Certainly effective countermoves 
depend on the situation.  In this essay I analyze one kind of countermove—crying foul—and explain why 
it may be reasonably expected to pressure opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics, as well 
as situational factors that contribute to its effectiveness.  
 Crying foul strategies include saying opponents are trying to terrify others into a decision, using 
inflammatory language, and the like.  I submit that crying foul pressures opponents to repair or abandon 
questionable tactics by making a norm determinate, and by making manifest the badness of the tactic 
and that the speaker is exercising forbearance.  These design features involve the speaker manifestly 
undertaking risks and creating risks for opponents to continue using questionable tactics, and thus 
generate pressure or persuasive force to repair or abandon the questionable tactic.  To support these 
claims, I first outline how a normative pragmatic theory of countering questionable tactics supplements 
comparable pragmatic theories of argumentation, and then analyze crying foul strategies used in a case 
of high-stakes political argumentation. 
 
Normative Pragmatic Theory of Countering Questionable Tactics 
Normative pragmatic theories, based on Kauffeld’s (2001, 2009) work in philosophy of language, 
generate models of how strategies are designed to work to, say, pressure auditors to recognize premise 
adequacy (Goodwin, 2003; Innocenti, 2005), accept a claim simply on a speaker’s say-so (Goodwin, 
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2001), respond to an accusation (Kauffeld, 1998), and more (e.g., Jacobs, 2000, 2006).  The models 
comprise practical reasoning by both speaker and auditors that explains how strategies both bring to 
bear in the situation norms of argumentation and create risks for both speaker and auditors of not 
adhering to them.  The practical reasoning need not be conscious thoughts; the aim is to provide a 
plausible theoretical account of why strategies may be reasonably expected to work based on tacit 
knowledge or an ordinary, pragmatic understanding of what makes sense (Kauffeld, 2001, 2009; 
Goodwin, 2001).  The nature of these theoretical models as well as key assumptions may be detailed by 
comparing them to other pragmatic theories of argumentation. 
The comparable theories most relevant to explaining why crying foul can be reasonably 
expected to counter questionable tactics are those that approach argumentation as interaction--as an 
exchange between speaker and auditors involving bilateral vectors of communication.  In contrast to 
models that attempt to explain unilateral communication vectors only, such as a message-to-receiver 
vector, an interaction model aims to account for how saying something both enables and constrains 
what both speaker and auditors may subsequently say.  A speaker may counter a questionable tactic at 
least in part in order to pressure auditors to repair or abandon the tactic, so a model of how a speaker 
may accomplish this ought to cover both speaker and auditors and how message design features enable 
and constrain the ongoing performances of each. 
The desirability of incorporating an interactive dynamic into theories of argument analysis and 
evaluation has been recognized by theorists who have developed pragmatic theories of argument.  As 
Johnson (2000) has noted about the traditional conception of argument:  “it failed to see that the 
development of the argument is just one phase of the entire dialectical process that also includes the 
response by the critic, the arguer’s response to that intervention, modification of the original argument, 
further criticism, and so on” (p. 144).  He describes arguing as “an unfolding dynamic in which the arguer 
puts forth an argument, the Other responds, the arguer responds, now the Other may respond again 
and so on, until they agree to stop” (Johnson, 2000, p. 157).  He captures the bilateral nature of the 
communication vectors when he amplifies the position that argument is dialectical:  “An exchange is 
dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one’s own logos (discourse, reasoning, or 
thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way” (Johnson, 2000, p. 161).  Likewise, van 
Eemeren and colleagues and Walton have constructed pragmatic theories of argumentation that 
analyze and evaluate arguments in the context of interactions (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; 
Walton, 1995).  A normative pragmatic theory of countering questionable tactics advances these 
pragmatic theories in several ways. 
First, a normative pragmatic theory accounts for reluctant auditors.  Doing so advances 
argumentation theory because if a model can explain difficult situations where auditors are reluctant to, 
say, argue at all, it should also be able to explain what seem to be easier cases of arguing—where 
speaker and auditors have goodwill toward each other and share common goals such as resolving a 
difference of opinion.  One example of stipulating cooperation as a normative ideal comes from Johnson 
(2000):  “the arguer agrees to let the feedback from the Other affect the product.  The arguer consents 
to take criticism and to take it seriously” (p. 161); and the arguer, critic, and those interested in the issue 
“agree to do nothing that would compromise either the substance or the appearance of rationality” (p. 
163).  Normative pragmatic theories, in contrast, explain situations where auditors cannot be counted 
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upon to agree to take criticism, to take it seriously, or to agree to manifest rationality in just the way 
demanded by a speaker.  For example, auditors may be reluctant to seriously consider a speaker's 
counter-plan because it may be in their self-interest to get their own proposal accepted.  It may be 
possible for them to reasonably dismiss a counter-plan on the grounds that decision-makers have time 
to consider serious proposals only.  To constrain their ability to dismiss a counter-plan, the speaker 
needs to design a message that pressures even reluctant auditors to give it serious consideration—to 
make manifest that it is serious, for example, by making manifest that it is well thought out and takes 
into consideration auditors' interests.  Other things being equal, if auditors were to quickly dismiss a 
proposal designed as such, they risk criticism for acting irresponsibly—for failing to manifest rationality 
(Kauffeld, 1998; see also Goodwin, 2001; Innocenti, 2005).  Thus it is possible to account for how 
message design features--such as manifesting that a proposal is well thought out and considers auditors' 
interests--pressure even reluctant auditors to act. 
 Second, normative pragmatic theories provide a rationale for why message design features may 
reasonably be expected to work.  To see how this advances other pragmatic theories of argument, 
consider for example the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation and in particular strategic 
maneuvering as a way of explaining how to counter questionable tactics.  Speakers strategically 
maneuver in an effort to get their own way (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002) and at the same time to 
resolve a difference of opinion on its merits.  The analytical elements of strategic maneuvering are topic 
selection, audience adaptation, and presentational devices (e.g., van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002).  As 
is the case for all strategies, it is possible to describe crying foul strategies in terms of strategic 
maneuvering.  The normative pragmatic analysis of crying foul presented in this essay differs from a 
pragma-dialectical analysis in that it describes the strategies not in terms of topic potential, audience 
adaptation, and presentational devices, but instead in terms of actions--i.e., what speakers crying foul 
do when they cry foul.  Analyzing strategies in terms of actions enables normative pragmatic theorists to 
generate practical, strategic rationales for why crying foul may reasonably be expected to counter 
questionable tactics. 
 To see how rationales provided by normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories 
compare, consider the guidelines that van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have proposed for how a 
speaker may counter questionable tactics--guidelines based on topic potential, audience adaptation, 
and presentational devices.  They recommend that the speaker “makes it optimally clear which aspects 
of the offender’s maneuvering, given this issue, this opponent and this manner of presentation, have 
derailed and conveys that the disputed maneuver, instead of retracting it altogether, should be 
readjusted by neutralizing the harmful factor so that the derailed maneuvering will be re-railed” (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006, p. 436).  They posit that this strategy works by “making it ‘manifest’ in the 
Ralph Johnson sense that the respondent is a reasonable discussion partner—and enhancing the 
chances that the ‘offender’ will effectuate the readjustment of his contribution and the discussion can 
go on” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006, p. 437).  A question that remains unanswered is why 
manifesting rationality in just this way can be expected to work to counter the questionable tactic.  
The pragma-dialectical account seems plausible in cases where opponents use a questionable 
tactic inadvertently or make an error.  On such occasions it seems plausible that they would readjust it 
when a speaker made them aware of how it is derailing the discussion and therefore the resolution of 
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the dispute.  Presumably opponents would want to correct their errors, and theorists need not presume 
goodwill as a rationale for why pointing out an error may reasonably be expected to result in a 
correction.  It is in opponents’ self-interest to correct their errors, because they would not want to risk 
criticism for continuing to make an error even after it had been pointed out to them. 
But now consider a case where opponents use the questionable tactic presumably because they 
believe it is in their self-interest and perhaps even reasonable to do so.  In this case making it optimally 
clear how opponents have derailed the discussion seems less likely to re-rail it and more likely to result 
in what van Eemeren and Houtlosser have described as a metadialogue about procedural matters.  As 
van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) have suggested, such metadialogues may distract from the 
“substantial matters” at hand, and “arguers may become impatient and get the impression that things 
are held up unnecessarily” (p. 436).  Their concern is serious given practical constraints such as time 
limits and given the need to maintain the legitimacy of the activity of arguing and its role in decision-
making procedures.  Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2006) do not advise how this metadialogue ought to 
proceed, but probably they would hold that ideally it ought to proceed as a critical discussion in which 
the standpoint at issue is whether the maneuvering violates a critical discussion rule (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992) and involves continuing to argue about how maneuvering has derailed the 
discussion away from dispute resolution.  But the question of why any particular move may be expected 
to work to re-rail the discussion remains unanswered. 
A normative pragmatic theory aims to answer that question—to provide a model comprised of 
interlocking practical reasoning by both speaker and auditors that accounts for message design 
strategies and provides a rationale for why a speaker may reasonably expect the strategies to work.  For 
example, researchers generating normative pragmatic theories have proposed models explaining the 
persuasive force of proposing and accusing (Kauffeld, 1998), appealing to authority and emotions 
(Goodwin, 2001; Innocenti, 2006), and more.  Broadly speaking, the models ground persuasive force (1) 
in norms that message design features bring to bear in situations, and (2) in risks for both speaker and 
auditors that doing so creates. 
Consider for example Goodwin’s (2001) model of dignity authority which I present in truncated 
form.  The question is how an appeal to authority pressures even reluctant auditors to accept a claim 
simply on a speaker’s say-so.  The core of the appeal is: to avoid insulting people of dignity, do not 
openly oppose them.  Message design features that the speaker uses to accomplish this include putting 
auditors in a position such that opposition will insult the speaker, and assuring auditors that the 
speaker's judgment is trustworthy.  Norms that these design features bring to bear in the situation are: 
do not insult a person of dignity, and act in a trustworthy manner.  The design features create a risk for 
auditors to dismiss the appeal (doing so would insult a person of dignity) but also create a reason for 
them to accept it (the speaker is trustworthy).  At the same time, by using these message design 
features, speakers openly undertake a risk:  they stake their claim on the trustworthiness of their 
judgment.  If it turns out that their claim is in error in some way, then the trustworthiness of their 
judgment is called into question.  Thus openly undertaking this risk creates another reason for auditors 
to accept the claim simply on the speaker’s say-so.  It creates an argumentative context such that 
auditors may reason that speakers would not risk their reputation for trustworthiness unless they were 
reasonably certain of the veracity of their claim.  And thus what at first glance may appear to be a 
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questionable tactic—appealing to authority—creates conditions such that auditors are reasonably 
pressured to act. 
Third, normative pragmatic theories account for how arguers themselves regulate the activity of 
arguing rather than measuring performances against an ideal model.  Walton (1995), for example, has 
developed a dialectically-oriented theory of fallacy that explicitly treats discussion of questionable 
tactics and illustrates a theory of evaluation that involves measuring a performance against an ideal.  
One kind of crying foul strategy is exclaiming “Fallacy!” which Walton (1995) describes as “a kind of 
charge put forward by one participant in reasonable dialogue against another participant.  To be 
sustained, the charge must be backed up by evidence, or it fails to hold up.  A charge of fallacy, 
therefore, carries with it a burden of proof for the proponent who has made the charge” (p. 262).  Thus 
the rationale he provides for how a charge of fallacy can be made to hold up seems to be based on a 
presumption that an arguer is innocent until proven guilty and on an ordinary understanding of burden 
of proof; the charge of “fallacy” is serious, and arguers and critics ought to be prepared to provide 
evidence if they expect it to hold up.  Walton’s (1995) advice for those making such a charge—or other 
charges about opponents' tactics—is to measure the tactic against the rules of informal logic (is 
evidence relevant and sufficient, for example) and against the context of the dialogue type in which it is 
used (e.g., pp. 271-272).  
 Walton’s dialogue types, like the pragma-dialecticians’ critical discussion, are ideal models.  As a 
result, rules and norms are deduced from the models themselves and in particular the goal that a 
particular dialogue type is designed to achieve.  For example, bargaining may be appropriate in a 
negotiation dialogue but not in a critical discussion, the goal of which is to resolve a difference of 
opinion based on the merits of the case.  Normative pragmatic theories, in contrast, begin with the 
communication transaction itself and analyze how arguers regulate the practice of arguing—what norms 
they bring to bear in particular situations, how they do so, and why they may reasonably expect the 
strategies to work.  Normative pragmatic theorists do not view the context of argumentation as given in 
advance and determinant of rules and norms, but instead as created, maintained, and changed in the 
course of arguing (Goodwin, 2007).  Normative pragmatic theories have explained why questionable 
tactics do not generate force or pressure (Innocenti, 2005, pp. 146-47; Innocenti, 2007, pp. 391-93).  In 
this essay I explain why arguers can expect crying foul to counter questionable tactics and to pressure 
opponents to repair or abandon the tactic. 
 
Crying Foul 
I submit that crying foul strategies pressure even reluctant auditors to repair or abandon 
questionable tactics by making a norm determinate, and by making manifest the badness of the tactic 
and that the speaker is exercising forbearance.  To support this claim I analyze crying foul strategies in 
the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention debates about whether Virginia should ratify the proposed United 
States Constitution.  The debates took place over a three-week period and may be best remembered for 
clashes between Antifederalist Patrick Henry and Federalist James Madison (e.g., Reid & Klumpp, 2005, 
pp. 148-73).  Significantly, delegates clash most intensely in the first week and a half of the debates; fear 
appeals are rampant as delegates argue that harmful consequences will occur if the Constitution is 
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ratified, or not ratified.  At this point in the debate, crying foul is also rampant.  In the analysis that 
follows, I explain why crying foul may account for the improved argumentative conduct. 
Almost certainly delegates would be reluctant to repair or abandon what opponents described 
as questionable tactics, because they would be reluctant to admit that the tactics were questionable.  It 
would be in their self-interest to not use questionable tactics because the debates took place before a 
viewing public and were published with an eye toward both a broader reading public and posterity (e.g., 
Elliot, 1891, pp. 21, 56, 637, 652).  And yet delegates find plenty of reasons to cry foul; they cry foul 
about emotional appeals circumventing reason (e.g., “Are we to be terrified into a belief of its necessity” 
[Elliot, 1891, p. 285; see also pp. 54, 62, 638]); about poor grounds ("It is a groundless objection, to work 
on gentlemen's apprehensions within these walls" [Elliot, 1891, p. 427; see also 154, 180, 212, 274, 313, 
383, 642]); about mismatches between style and subject matter (an opponent "has highly colored the 
dangers" [Elliot, 1891, p. 466; see also 95, 191, 225, 277, 383]).  Even Patrick Henry, the delegate who 
speaks most often (Briceland, 1988, p. 211; Rutland, 1966, p. 226, 233) and almost certainly uses 
questionable tactics most often, cries foul about delegates who try to make spectators "intimidated by 
imaginary dangers" and to lead their minds "away by unfair misrepresentations and uncandid 
suggestions" (Elliot, 1891, p. 140).  Why could Henry and other delegates expect crying foul to pressure 
opponents to repair or abandon what they treated as questionable tactics? 
One response to a questionable tactic is to ignore it—to proceed without crying foul and instead 
to continue making a case by stating claims and providing evidence so delegates are in a position to act 
on the merits of the case only.  This response could be reasonably expected to work on an occasion 
when a speaker can count on the merits of arguments to speak for themselves—when the speaker can 
count on delegates to see that the speaker adheres to norms of argumentation while they do not, and 
can count on this to create a compelling reason for them to repair or abandon a questionable tactic.  In 
the Virginia ratifying convention debates, ignoring questionable tactics and proceeding to argue well on 
the merits only would also involve the speaker counting on spectators to see that the speaker adheres 
to norms of argumentation while other delegates do not, and counting on this additional level of 
accountability to create another compelling reason for delegates to repair or abandon a questionable 
tactic. 
 However, the strategy of ignoring a questionable tactic carries risks even and perhaps especially 
if the speaker can count on spectators to see that other delegates do not adhere to norms of 
argumentation.  Delegates can continue to use questionable tactics because the speaker has not created 
any reason for them not to use them; delegates can plausibly deny that the tactics are questionable and 
that the speaker judges them to be questionable.  Delegates presumably used it in the first place 
because they believed it would pass muster and achieve some purpose or purposes.  If delegates 
continue to use it with impunity, the speaker risks criticism by spectators either for not recognizing a 
questionable tactic or for not trying to promote the legitimacy of the transaction.  The speaker can avoid 
this criticism by crying foul. 
 
  
Innocenti, Beth. "Countering Questionable Tactics by Crying Foul." Argumentation and Advocacy 47 (2011): 178-88. 
Publisher’s official version: http://www.americanforensics.org/publications-and-research/argumentation-/argumentation-and-
advocacy.  Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
 
7 
Making a norm determinate 
Now consider a case where the speaker cries foul to counter a questionable tactic.  Why could a 
speaker reasonably expect crying foul to pressure opponents to repair or abandon a questionable tactic?  
First, crying foul makes a norm determinate.  Asking “Are we to be terrified into a belief of its necessity” 
makes determinate a norm that belief ought to be earned by reason.  Asserting that a statement is “a 
groundless objection” makes determinate a norm that objections ought to be based on grounds.  Noting 
that an opponent “has highly colored the dangers” makes determinate a norm that style ought to be 
appropriate for subject matter.  Making a norm determinate pressures delegates to adhere to it because 
it holds them accountable for knowing it.  Making a norm determinate constrains their ability to say they 
did not know the norm or see its relevance to their own conduct, because saying so would put them at 
risk for criticism for being ill-equipped to participate in the proceedings; in the case of the Virginia 
ratifying convention, delegates ought to manifest a capacity to act as responsible decision-makers—to 
reason well—and apparently failing to understand norms and their relevance is a fallible sign that they 
lack this capacity.  The risk is serious since capacities for responsible decision-making are made 
determinate throughout the proceedings when, for example, delegates say that opponents' appeals are 
"trifling with the judgment of their fellow-citizens" (Elliot, 1891, p. 48; see also pp. 237, 248, 293); 
politics are "too often nourished by passion, at the expense of the understanding" (Elliot, 1891, p. 23; 
see also pp. 86, 177); every delegate "comes with a firm resolution coolly and calmly to examine, and 
fairly and impartially to determine" (Elliot, 1891, p. 42; see also pp. 68, 93, 104, 127, 213, 486); that 
assent ought to be earned by “not the dignity of names, but the force of reasoning” (Elliot, 1891, p. 85).  
To avoid such criticism, delegates may repair or abandon questionable tactics and adhere to the norm. 
Of course it would also be possible for delegates to take issue with the speaker’s 
characterization of their tactics—to argue or, put differently, hold a metadialogue about the propriety of 
argumentative tactics.  Presumably the speaker would want to forestall such a metadialogue rather than 
risk criticism for delaying discussion of the issues at hand or for damaging the proceedings or his own 
reputation for responsible citizenship by crying foul when the tactic is fair.  Making a norm determinate 
is a fallible sign that the speaker is making an effort to regulate the fairness and legitimacy of the 
proceedings, even if doing so creates a risk to himself for criticism.  Manifestly undertaking this risk 
creates an additional reason for delegates to repair or abandon the questionable tactic, because it 
creates a context in which they and spectators can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism 
unless he had made a responsible assessment of opponents’ conduct on that occasion.  
 In short, making a norm determinate pressures delegates to adhere to it—to repair or abandon 
a questionable tactic—because doing so creates risks for them to continue using it as well as risks for 
the speaker for criticism for de-railing the proceedings. 
 
Making badness manifest 
A speaker can make norms determinate in any number of ways, including stating them in 
declarative sentences such as, “Claims ought to be supported by relevant evidence.”  The added value of 
“crying foul” strategies or, put differently, a second core feature is that they make manifest the badness 
of opponents' conduct.  Statements that opponents are terrifying people into a decision, proffering 
groundless objections, highly coloring dangers, and the like make manifest the badness of the tactic.  
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Making manifest the badness of the tactic pressures opponents to repair or abandon the tactic by 
creating risks for both opponents and speaker.  By making manifest the badness of the tactic, the 
speaker openly undertakes a commitment to the position that he is upset that opponents are acting in a 
way that damages the deliberations.  Thus the speaker creates a context such that if opponents 
continue to use the questionable tactic, they risk criticism for continuing to damage the proceedings; 
because making manifest the badness of the tactic constrains the possibility of them saying that they did 
not realize the tactic was inappropriate or damaging the proceedings.  It does so by holding them 
accountable for knowing this; if they did not know it prior to the proceedings, they cannot deny knowing 
it now as it has been made manifest.  The delegates in the Virginia ratification debates make the risk 
serious by pointing to the need for good deliberations--for delegates to avoid outside influence (Elliot, 
1891, pp. 7, 177), for example, or to base their decision on "the force of reasoning" and not 
"declamation nor elegance of periods" which may "mislead the judgment" (Elliot, 1891, p. 104).  To 
avoid the risks, opponents may repair or abandon the tactic.  Thus the force of making manifest the 
badness of opponents' conduct derives from bringing to bear in the situation a norm of acting in a way 
that enables good deliberation and judgment. 
 Of course opponents could respond by denying that they are damaging the proceedings—by 
initiating a metadialogue about the propriety of the tactics.  Again, the speaker would want to forestall 
the possibility of initiating a metadialogue.  Manifesting the badness of opponents’ tactics helps to do 
so.  Manifesting the badness of opponents’ tactics licenses them to retaliate, because the speaker has 
impugned their conduct and thus creates a risk to the speaker of criticism for unfairly impugning their 
conduct.  Unfairly impugning their conduct is a fallible sign that the speaker does not understand 
appropriate tactics and puts opponents in a position to say that the speaker is damaging the 
proceedings both by unfair conduct and by delaying discussion of the matter at hand.  Manifestly 
undertaking this risk creates an additional reason for opponents to repair or abandon a questionable 
tactic, because it creates a context such that they and spectators may reason that the speaker would not 
risk criticism unless he had fairly impugned the opponents’ conduct.  The more the speaker makes 
manifest the badness of the tactic, the more risk he undertakes, and the more need he has to make 
manifest the responsibility of his assessment of opponents’ tactics. 
 
Exercising forbearance 
As the analysis so far suggests, making a norm determinate and making manifest the badness of 
the tactic alone could create grounds for opponents to retaliate and refuse to participate in the 
proceedings if the speaker has impugned their good name unfairly.  How can a speaker pressure 
opponents to repair or abandon a questionable tactic rather than abandon the proceedings altogether?  
Another core feature of crying foul that forestalls the possibility that opponents can abandon the 
proceedings with impunity is making manifest that the speaker is exercising forbearance—is giving 
opponents an opportunity to repair or abandon the questionable tactic rather than abandoning the 
proceedings altogether on the grounds that opponents are acting unfairly.  By doing so the speaker 
brings to bear in the situation a presumption of fairness—a commitment to fair proceedings.  Despite a 
commitment to the position that opponents have used an unfair tactic—a commitment made manifest 
by crying foul—the speaker does not elect to abandon the proceedings but, by crying foul, makes 
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manifest that he exercises forbearance—that he expects opponents to amend their conduct so the 
proceedings can continue.  This constrains opponents’ ability to abandon the proceedings because doing 
so would be a fallible sign that they do not recognize the speaker’s fairness in exercising forbearance.  
Thus they risk criticism for damaging the proceedings through both using a questionable tactic and 
refusing to participate appropriately even when given a fair opportunity to do so. 
At the same time that exercising forbearance creates a risk for opponents to continue damaging 
the proceedings by continuing to use a questionable tactic or by abandoning the proceedings, it also 
generates a risk of criticism for the speaker. Exercising forbearance—expecting opponents to make 
amends—creates a context in which opponents can criticize the speaker for delaying the proceedings 
because, in the case of a questionable tactic, the speaker demands a response about procedural matters 
that stalls discussion of the issue at hand.  In the case of a fallacious tactic, the speaker undertakes a risk 
of criticism by spectators for exercising forbearance when the fallacy warrants abandoning the 
proceedings—when abandoning the proceedings is perhaps the most reasonable response for creating a 
context in which opponents can no longer use the questionable tactic.  The speaker manifestly assuming 
this risk enables opponents and spectators to reason that the speaker is making a good faith effort to 
continue the proceedings—even when doing so involves a risk of criticism about the propriety of the 
speaker's own conduct—and therefore to seriously consider repairing or abandoning the questionable 
tactic.  The speaker stakes his claim about the propriety of opponents’ tactics on his own claim to be a 
fair, responsible participant in the proceedings. 
 A speaker may make manifest that he has responsibly assessed opponents’ conduct and is 
arguing fairly in other ways.  For example, a speaker may make manifest that his assessment is 
responsible by manifesting the comparative quality of his own conduct--by making manifest that he has 
grounds for a position, for example, or asking opponents to state exactly what grounds they have; 
throughout the debates delegates call for opponents to provide grounds (e.g., Elliot, 1891, pp. 12, 66, 
87).  Giving them a chance to provide grounds—to make their case--shows that he is exercising 
forbearance.  Again, this is a fallible sign that he has attempted to make a responsible assessment of 
opponents’ conduct and, thus, forestalls criticism that he has unfairly impugned the conduct.  In short, 
the more a speaker makes manifest the badness of opponents’ tactics, the greater the risk of criticism 
the speaker accrues for his own tactics and conduct, and therefore the stronger the force or pressure on 
both himself and opponents to adhere to norms of argumentation and argue responsibly. 
 
Conclusions 
Crying foul pressures opponents to repair or abandon questionable tactics by making norms 
determinate, and by making manifest the badness of opponents' tactics and that the speaker is 
exercising forbearance.  Crying foul generates pressure, based in norms of argumentation brought to 
bear in the situation, by creating risks for both speaker and opponents. 
This analysis helps to explain van Eemeren and Houtlosser's (2006) observation that arguers 
ought not automatically counter fallacious moves by invoking rules with a goody two-shoes response.  
The persuasive force of crying foul depends on the situation or context.  In the context of a debate class 
in a university, for example, invoking rules could pressure opponents to adhere to them because the 
norms of argumentation brought to bear in the situation align with norms made manifest in the broader 
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classroom context.  But in some--perhaps many or all--civic contexts, political actors cannot count on 
spectators having a uniformly good education in sound reasoning.  This would explain why in the 
Virginia ratification debates delegates do not invoke rules in a dialectical vein to counter questionable 
tactics.  Instead, by crying foul delegates bring to bear in the situation converging rhetorical and political 
norms.  For example, making manifest that opponents have used questionable grounds to work on 
spectators’ fears, and that in doing so opponents damage the quality of the proceedings and the 
political process, increases the pressure generated by crying foul to repair or abandon the questionable 
tactic.  The pressure generated by crying foul--e.g., saying opponents are terrifying into belief, making 
groundless objections, misrepresenting facts, and the like--derives from bringing to bear in the situation 
and making determinate a broader norm:  do not interfere with the capacity to deliberate and judge.  
This norm is both rhetorical and a norm of political representation and citizenship.  Making determinate 
this broader, political, procedural norm increases the risks to delegates of manifesting poor judgment on 
the level of a particular argument, because it makes manifest that localized flaws damage the 
proceedings and political process as well. 
If this is accurate, then there are three complementary explanations for why delegates in the 
Virginia ratification debates consistently counter questionable tactics by crying foul and do so by 
bringing to bear in the situation norms of argumentation that converge with political norms.  First, 
consider the fact that crying foul makes a norm determinate. Arguers must bring to bear in the situation 
norms that opponents do know or ought to know.  This is why speakers can count on norms to pressure 
opponents to adhere to them.  In the context of a debate by political elites before a broad citizenry, 
delegates may reasonably expect opponents and spectators to know the broader norms of the political 
culture—or may reasonably expect them to act as if they know them rather than risk criticism for poor 
citizenship.  Thus making norms determinate both brings to bear in the situation norms that citizens 
know and coaches citizens in norms they ought to know. 
Second, consider the fact that crying foul makes manifest the badness of opponents' conduct.  
In a civic context, delegates may not be able to count on opponents and spectators acknowledging the 
badness of a tactic because by one measure it may align with a norm of effectiveness.  In tension are 
norms of short-term, personal effectiveness and long-term, political and cultural effectiveness in the 
sense of promoting political ideals.  These two senses of effectiveness need not be mutually exclusive, 
but political actors must balance short-term personal success with longer-term success and civic goods.  
Crying foul--making badness manifest--is one way arguers may tip the balance. 
 Third, consider the fact that crying foul makes manifest that the speaker is exercising 
forbearance.  In a civic context, speakers must negotiate manifesting adherence to, first, a broader 
political norm of engaging in principled opposition and, second, a more procedural-level norm of 
refusing to participate in a transaction with opponents who will not act fairly.  Making manifest that he 
is exercising forbearance enables a speaker to engage the force of both norms—to manifest 
commitments to participating in the proceedings and to the quality of transactions comprising the 
proceedings.  Manifesting a commitment to the legitimacy of the proceedings seems particularly 
important since regular, unchecked de-railments on a local level create grounds for spectators to ignore 
the proceedings and thus decrease the pressure of generating accountability.  This also points to the 
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desirability of self-regulation in arguing—that metadialogues about procedural matters are not external 
to the workings of arguing but an inherent part of their quality. 
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